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Abstract Representationalist theories of the phenomenal character of conscious
experience are attractive because they promise a simpler ‘naturalization’ of the
mind. However, I argue that representationalists cannot endorse an otherwise
attractive externalist theory of the representational contents of conscious experi-
ences. The combination of representationalism and externalism conflicts with a true
principle linking phenomenal character to perceptual indistinguishability.
1 Externalist Representationalism and Indistinguishability
Representationalism is the view that: necessarily, two conscious experiences differ
in phenomenal character—‘what it is like’ to undergo those experiences—if and
only if they differ in representational content. I argue in this paper that
representationalists cannot be externalists about the representational contents of
experiences. Representationalists cannot hold, that is, that mere extrinsic differences
between two subjects (or one subject at different times) might suffice to distinguish
the representational contents of those subjects’ experiences (or a single subject’s
experiences across times).
Representationalism is attractive to its proponents mainly for the promise it
seems to hold for the project of ‘naturalizing’ the mind. If mental representation can
be understood in naturalistic terms, and the phenomenal character of an experience
is either identical or equivalent1 to its representational content, then a naturalistic
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understanding of phenomenal character ought to be possible as well. Although there
are significant exceptions, representationalists typically combine their representa-
tionalism with an externalist theory of content for experiences.2 This is because
representationalists tend to find externalist views of mental representation more
convincing than their internalist rivals, including for the sort of mental represen-
tation implicated in conscious experience. However, as the argument presented
below will show, representationalism combined with externalism is a volatile
mixture. The resulting view, which I will henceforth call externalist representa-
tionalism (ER), has a consequence that cannot be correct.
My argument against ER will appeal to a principle, which I take to be a necessary
truth, linking the perceptual indistinguishability of (perceptible) properties of
objects to the lack of large phenomenal differences in the perceptual experiences
produced by those properties. Roughly, the principle is that perceptually indistin-
guishable properties of objects do not produce experiences of those features that
differ greatly or dramatically in phenomenal character. I will argue that ER implies
that perceptually indistinguishable features of objects may give rise to experiences
with dramatically different phenomenal characters, and hence, given the linking
principle, that externalist representationalism is false.
The underlying motivation for the principle that I claim conflicts with ER, and
which I will formulate more precisely below, is the thought that dramatic
phenomenal differences between experiences are evidence for differences in their
causes. If a phenomenal difference between experiences is large enough, that will
put one in a position to justifiably believe that the properties of the objects causing
those experiences are indeed different, and thus in a position to distinguish the
properties.3 The principle is a close cousin of one to which Block (1998) appeals,
according to which, necessarily, large, fast changes in phenomenal character are
introspectively noticeable (Block 1998, 668). (I will say more about the connection
between Block’s principle and mine in Sect. 5, below.)
The relevant sort of perceptual indistinguishability is one that holds, as I have
said, between properties of objects. Or, as it might also be put, it is indistinguish-
ability-in-a-certain-respect. Two objects might be distinguishable because they are
differently shaped, while indistinguishable in some other respect—in their colors,
for example. Imagine looking, in normal viewing conditions, at two ripe tomatoes,
one of which is visibly larger than the other, but both of which are exactly the same
shade and hue of red. In such a case, the two tomatoes will produce perceptual
experiences with different phenomenal characters in you, since their differing sizes
will make a phenomenal difference. However, given their color sameness (and the
2 Dretske (1997, 2004), Harman (1990), Tye (1995, 1998) and Lycan (1996, 2001, 2004) all argue for
externalist versions of representationalism. Chalmers (2004) is an exception. Chalmers is a represen-
tationalist, but he is an internalist about the representational contents of conscious experiences.
3 Justifiably believing on the basis of perception that properties of objects are distinct is not quite enough
to distinguish them, since one might justifiably believe that properties are distinct when they are not
distinct in fact. However, if one is in a position to justifiably believe on the basis of perception that
properties are distinct and they really are objectively distinct, then that ought to suffice for perceptual
distinguishability. The cases I will appeal to later as test cases for ER all involve objects that differ
objectively in their perceptible properties, so this complication will not affect the later discussion.
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fact that viewing conditions are normal), they are indistinguishable in respect of
color. If I am right that there is a necessary connection between perceptual
indistinguishability and the absence of large phenomenal differences, this will imply
that the phenomenal characters of the color experiences the tomatoes produce in you
do not differ greatly; what it is like to experience the color of the one tomato is not
dramatically different from what it is like experience the color of the other, even if,
overall, the two tomatoes produce phenomenally very different experiences in you.4
What is it, exactly, to be unable to perceptually distinguish the color of one
tomato from the color of another? It is not simply to be incapable of knowing or
justifiably believing that the two differ in color, since one might know that they
differ in color, if they do, for reasons that have nothing to do with perceiving the
tomatoes’ colors. (A trustworthy friend could inform you that the two differ in color,
for example.) The indistinguishability in question is perceptual indistinguishability;
it is being unable to know or justifiably believe on the basis of perception that the
tomatoes differ in color. It will be helpful to keep this point in mind in thinking
about some of the examples that will be presented later: one can know or justifiably
believe that two objects differ in their perceptible properties without that implying
that one can tell, perceptually, that they so differ.
‘Phenomenal’ and related terminology are used in different ways by different
writers, so it is important to be clear that its use here is to be interpreted in the
Nagelian way (cf. Nagel 1974): two experiences differ in phenomenal character just
in case what it is like for a given subject to undergo the one is different from what it
is like for that subject to undergo the other. Interpreted in this way, phenomenal
character is different from what many authors mean by ‘qualia.’ Qualia are usually
conceived as non-relational elements of an experience, such as the yellowness of a
mental image, whereas phenomenal character in the Nagelian sense is explicitly
relational. Phenomenal character is what it is like for the subject to undergo the
experience. Importantly, most representationalists interpret ‘phenomenal character’
in this Nagelian way as well. Representationalism is a theory of, precisely, Nagelian
phenomenal character.
With these clarifications in place, the principle linking perceptual indistinguish-
ability and phenomenal character can now be more precisely formulated:
(U) Necessarily, if (i) two objects x and y are perceptually indistinguishable, in
a respect, R, for a normal human subject, S, at a time t, and (ii) x and y differ
4 Of course, in some cases, not just phenomenal similarity, but phenomenal type-identity—sameness of
phenomenal character—goes hand in hand with perceptual indistinguishability. This is a natural
description of the case of the same colored tomatoes described in the main text; they are indistinguishable
in respect of color and your experiences of their colors are not just similar, but the same, in phenomenal
character. However, a principle to the effect that the perceptual indistinguishability of features implies
that the experiences of those features have the same phenomenal character has highly controversial
consequences. For example, such a principle appears to run into trouble with the transitivity of the
relation of sameness of phenomenal character (cf. Graff 2001, on the so-called ‘phenomenal sorites,’ and
an earlier paper of mine, Deutsch 2005, on issues of representationalism and indistinguishability.)
Discussion of these controversial consequences is best avoided here, given that my main aim is to build a
case against ER. The case against ER can make do with the weaker principle (to be spelled out more fully
below in the main text) linking indistinguishability between features of objects to the absence of large
phenomenal differences between the perceptual experiences of those features.
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objectively with respect to R, then the perceptual experiences caused by x and
y in S at t are not, R-wise, dramatically phenomenally different.5
‘Respects’ are simply the perceptible properties—color, shape, size, smell, feel,
etc.—of perceptible objects. An experience produced by an object, x, and another
produced by a different object, y, are ‘not, R-wise, dramatically phenomenally
different’ when the overall perceptual experiences produced by x and y are not
dramatically phenomenally different relative to the relevant respect, R. So, for
example, if x and y are different colors but nevertheless indistinguishable in color,
(U) implies that a subject’s experiences of the differing colors of x and y will not be
dramatically phenomenally different.
Clause (ii) of (U)’s antecedent is in place to avoid complications over what,
exactly, follows concerning distinguishability when the properties of objects do not
produce experiences that differ dramatically in phenomenal character. If x and y are
objectively exactly the same in color (as in the case of the same-colored, but
differently-sized tomatoes described above), then they will not, in ordinary
perceptual circumstances, produce color experiences that are dramatically phenom-
enally different. But it should not follow that they are then distinguishable in color,
since that would seem to imply that they are different colors. So, the cases to which
(U) is meant to apply, and all the cases to which I will apply it later, are cases in
which the relevant perceptual objects do differ objectively in some respect; in fact,
all of the cases discussed below will concern cases of differently colored objects.6
I have no general criterion for determining how large a phenomenal difference
between two perceptual experiences must be to count (U)’s consequent false. This is
not a serious problem, however, since there are examples of phenomenal differences
that are obviously large enough, even if the boundary between those that are and
those that are not is not obvious. For example, a visual experience of a particular
color is very phenomenally different from a visual experience of that color’s
complementary color; red things cause distinctly different phenomenal color
experiences than those caused by green things. All of the cases used below to bolster
my argument against ER will involve obvious cases of large visual phenomenal
differences. In fact, all of the cases will involve the phenomenal difference between
5 It might seem as though it would simplify things to formulate (U) in terms of the indistinguishability
simpliciter of objects instead of complicating matters by bringing in reference to respects and the
indistinguishability of respects. However it turns out to be difficult to explain what the perceptual
indistinguishability of objects comes to. On the one hand, it seems that no two perceptible objects are ever
strictly indistinguishable, since, for example, they will possess differing perceptible relational properties.
On the other hand, weakening the relevant notion of indistinguishability so that it is a matter of being
incapable of telling of two objects ‘which is which’ makes the notion too weak. I might not be able to tell,
of two identical twins, for example, which is which, even if one twin is producing in me an experience
very phenomenally different from the experience the other is producing in me. (Because, say, one is
facing towards me and the other away.) Of course, (U) will imply that objects that are indistinguishable in
every respect are indistinguishable simpliciter, but indistinguishability in every respect is rare. In any
case, difficult issues concerning the indistinguishability of objects, or the implications of being unable to
tell which of two objects is which, may be safely left to the side. The kind of ‘indistinguishability-in-a-
certain-respect’ I describe in the main text is the only sort to which I will appeal in my argument against
ER.
6 See note 3, above.
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the visual experience typically produced in a normal human subject in normal
viewing conditions by looking at something red, and the visual experience typically
produced in a normal human subject in normal viewing conditions by looking at
something green.
The argument for (U) is simply that it is difficult to see how phenomenal
differences that large could be caused by indistinguishable properties of objects;
when phenomenal differences are that large, the subject can appeal to the dramatic
differences in the way the objects look (feel, taste, smell, sound) in judging that their
properties are different. If their properties really are different, then this, it seems, is
enough for the subject to distinguish them.
Supposing, now, that (U) is true, as I claim, how does its truth conflict with ER?
The externalist part of ER implies that respects in which objects are perceptually
indistinguishable may give rise to perceptual experiences that differ in content, and,
in particular, in the representation of the indistinguishable respects themselves. For
example, the externalist part of ER implies that it is possible that a red tomato is
indistinguishable in respect of color from a green tomato even while a subject’s
experiences of the two tomatoes represent their colors correctly—the first as red and
the second as green. However, the representationalist part of ER implies that
experiences that differ in content differ in phenomenal character. So representa-
tionalism implies that a color experience of a tomato that represents the tomato as
red is phenomenally very different from a color experience of a tomato that
represents the tomato as green. Put these implications together and we have the
‘possibility’ that (U) rules out: objects that are perceptually indistinguishable in a
given respect but which are phenomenally very different relative to that very
respect—objects that are perceptually indistinguishable in color that produce
dramatically phenomenally different color experiences, for example.
A version of Block’s (1990) story of ‘Inverted Earth’ can be used to show that ER
has this problematic implication. I elaborate the relevant version of the Inverted
Earth story in Sect. 3. First, in Sect. 2, I review the reason why the original tale of
Inverted Earth, as Block told it, has appeared to many to be ineffective against ER.
2 Inverted Earth and Experiential Memory
Inverted Earth is a planet just like Earth except that everything there has a color
complementary to the color it has on Earth. On Inverted Earth, the sky is yellow,
ripe tomatoes are green, lemons are blue, and so on. Were you to travel to Inverted
Earth, things would appear dramatically different in color from the way they appear
back home on Earth. Suppose you take a trip to Inverted Earth but that before going
you have special color-inverting lenses implanted in your eyes. Ripe red Earth
tomatoes look green with the lenses in. In fact, they look exactly the way ripe green
Inverted Earth tomatoes would look with the lenses out.
You take your trip and enjoy yourself so much that you decide to stay. Initially,
your experiences of ripe Inverted Earth tomatoes misrepresent their color. Ripe
Inverted Earth tomatoes are green, but your experiences represent them as having
the same color as Earth tomatoes, namely red. However, according to at least some
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varieties of externalism, eventually a representational shift occurs: your experiences
go from misrepresenting ripe Inverted Earth tomatoes as red to correctly
representing them as green.
Externalists who think that experiences represent those objects and properties
that are their ‘‘dominant casual source’’ (henceforth, ‘DCS-externalism’) must
accept that a representational shift is possible, and occurs in the story as told. In the
story, the dominant causal source of the type of experience you have when looking
at ripe Inverted Earth tomatoes is, at first, ripe red Earth tomatoes. But you have
taken up permanent residence on Inverted Earth and so eventually all of your ripe
tomato experiences come to be caused by green Inverted Earth tomatoes. Green
tomatoes come to be the dominant causal source of your ripe tomato experiences
and so those experiences come to represent tomatoes (correctly) as green.
Block’s intuition, which I share, is that your ripe tomato experiences, whether of
Earth tomatoes, color-inverting lenses out, or of Inverted Earth tomatoes, color-
inverting lenses in, will be identical in phenomenal character. Or rather, more
precisely, your visual experiences of the color of the ripe tomatoes you encounter
will not differ in their phenomenal character. If Block’s intuition is correct, the
representational shift is not accompanied by a phenomenal shift: your ripe tomato
experiences go from representing ripe tomatoes as red to representing them as
green, but they undergo no corresponding shift in phenomenal character. Since the
representationalist part of ER is true only if a phenomenal shift accompanies the
representational shift, Block’s intuition, if correct, implies that ER is false. (More
carefully, it implies that DCS variety of ER is false. I will return later, in Sect. 4, to
the issue of other externalisms; for now, take ‘ER’ to refer to a DCS variety.)
One externalist representationalist commentator on Block’s Inverted Earth story,
Lycan (1996, 2001, 2004), has complained that if there is a representational shift
(Lycan’s official view is that there is no such shift in the story as told.), then,
intuitions be damned, there is a phenomenal shift as well. At the very least, what is
needed, Lycan has complained, is some independent reason for accepting intuition
over theory in this case.
Block (1996, 1998) has attempted to supply an independent reason, arguing that
facts about what you, in your role in the story of Inverted Earth, will remember
about your past experiences imply, or at least provide evidence for, the claim that
there is no phenomenal shift. Lycan (1996, 2001, 2004) and Tye (1995, 1998) have
responded by pointing out that externalists can hold that the environmental
differences between Earth and Inverted Earth will affect the representational
contents of your memory beliefs just as much as they will affect the contents of your
experiences.
Suppose you are in an Inverted Earth produce aisle staring, color-inverting lenses
in, at a ripe Inverted Earth tomato. The representational shift has occurred and so
your experience represents the tomato as green. You describe the tomato as
‘‘looking red’’ although, assuming a Putnamian ‘‘semantic externalism,’’ your term
‘red’ now means green. You sincerely say to yourself: ‘‘I wonder whether the first
ripe tomato I ever encountered looked red, just as this one does. Let me think. Ah,
now I remember, yes, it did.’’ Is this evidence that the relevant ripe tomato
experiences have the same phenomenal character? Unfortunately, it is not. As Lycan
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and Tye have argued, given externalism about the ‘‘propositional attitudes,’’ the
belief you express on Inverted Earth, after the representational shift has occurred, by
saying, ‘‘The first ripe tomato I encountered looked red to me,’’ is true only if the
first tomato you encountered looked green to you. But that tomato looked red to
you. So this memory belief, among many others of your beliefs about the colors of
things you encountered in the past, will be false, and so not evidence for anything.
There is no reason why externalists about experiential contents should not be
semantic and propositional attitude externalists as well. But these latter externalisms
provide externalist representationalists with a fairly convincing reply to Block’s
attempt to use facts about memory to support his intuition about Inverted Earth.
3 Four-Eyed Inverted Earth
As I have admitted, I share Block’s intuition about Inverted Earth. When I imagine
myself as the subject in the story, I find it impossible to believe that what it is like
for me, lenses in, to experience ripe Inverted Earth tomatoes is any different at the
beginning of my stay on Inverted Earth than it is past the representational shift, or
that my past experiences, lenses out, of ripe Earth tomatoes differ in phenomenal
character from my current experiences of ripe Inverted Earth tomatoes. In some
moods, the mere existence of the Blockian intuition strikes me as damaging enough
to ER, and I wonder whether Lycan’s demand for some independent reason for
favoring intuition over theory in the case is dialectically fair. But I also think that
the demand can be met. Not by an appeal to experiential memory, which is
problematic for the reason already reviewed, but by an appeal to perceptual
indistinguishability and its connection, expressed by (U), to the absence of large
phenomenal differences.
Here is the basic idea. It can be built into the Inverted Earth story that there are at
least two ripe tomatoes which are different but exactly complementary shades, one a
shade of red and the other the complementary shade of green. According to ER, a
subject’s color experiences of these two will (eventually) represent them as very
different in color. But the story can be told in such a way that the colors of the two
tomatoes are, for the subject of the story, perceptually indistinguishable. ER will
then imply that the tomatoes cause color experiences with dramatically different
phenomenal characters, but (U) says that such a thing is impossible. So ER is false.
What the subject of the story remembers about the phenomenal characters of his or
her ripe tomato experiences is irrelevant. If representationally very different color
experiences are produced by ripe tomatoes that are indistinguishable, color-wise,
then ER is false.
Consider the first ripe tomato that you (in your starring role in the Inverted Earth
story) ever saw on Earth. Call it ‘Tom’. Tom was red and represented as such by
your experience of it. Now consider the first ripe tomato you encountered on
Inverted Earth, after the representational shift had already occurred. Call it ‘Mot.’
Mot was green and, according to the externalist, represented by your experience as
such. Suppose that Mot is, in fact, a shade of green that is the exact complementary
shade to Tom’s shade of red. On externalist representationalist grounds, this large
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representational difference between the two experiences should be accompanied by
a large phenomenal difference. However, despite the alleged large representational
difference in your experiences of Tom and Mot, you could not have told the
tomatoes apart in terms of color. You happen to know that Tom and Mot are
different colors, but this knowledge is based on general knowledge of yourself and
your circumstances; it is not based on the perceptual experiences that Tom and Mot
produce(d) in you. Given that the perceptual experiences caused in you by Tom and
Mot do not provide you with grounds for distinguishing their colors, and given the
truth of (U), it would seem to follow that the color experiences Tom and Mot caused
in you were not dramatically phenomenally different. So ER is false.
Unfortunately, there is a flaw in this reasoning having to do with the claim that
you cannot tell (could not have told) Tom’s and Mot’s colors apart. The color of first
ripe tomato you ever saw on Earth (Tom) is, and has always been, perceptually
distinguishable from the color of first ripe tomato you saw on Inverted Earth (Mot),
post-representational shift. If the two tomatoes, somehow preserved, were to be
brought before you now, they would look to you to be different in color. Earth Tom
would ‘‘look green,’’ as you would put it, while Inverted Earth Mot would ‘‘look
red.’’ The phenomenal difference would lead you to suppose that Tom and Mot
differ in color and you would be right: Tom is red and Mot is green. The colors of
Tom and Mot are perceptually distinguishable for you after all and so do not provide
the relevant sort of example—an example of two perceptually indistinguishable
features of objects that allegedly give rise to phenomenally very different
experiences of those features.
Intuitively, what is needed is a case in which Tom, looking to you just as it did
when you first encountered it, and Mot are viewed at once. If such a case were
possible, intuition suggests that Tom and Mot would then be perceptually
indistinguishable in respect of color. However, the externalist representationalist
can argue that Tom cannot now look to you as it did when you first encountered it.
Your perceptual system has changed. Your experiences of ripe tomatoes have
shifted in their contents and, according ER, this necessitates a shift in their
phenomenal characters. Tom and Mot cannot but differ in producing experiences
with dramatically different phenomenal characters, or so the externalist represen-
tationalist may argue. In fact, this difficulty in producing a relevant case—in which
two objects, indistinguishable in color, give rise to color experiences which, on ER
grounds, differ greatly in phenomenal character—can make it appear as though the
appeal to experiential memory is the only recourse for those, such as myself,
wishing to defend the Blockian intuition. Since, according to our opponents, Tom
cannot now produce an experience phenomenally similar to the type of experience it
produced when first encountered, we must retreat to claims about experiential
memory: the subject, in remembering what it was like to experience Tom, can
discern no difference between what it was like to experience Tom, and what it is
like to experience Mot. But the appeal to experiential memory is problematic for the
reason already reviewed.
Fortunately, there is a modification of the Inverted Earth story that seems to me
to circumvent this difficulty. Imagine a planet, ‘Four-Eyed Earth,’ that is just like
earth except that all of its human inhabitants have, literally, eyes in the backs of
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their heads. The eyes in the front of a Four-Eyed Earthling’s head are functionally
and physiologically identical to the eyes found in ordinary Earthlings. The eyes in
the backs of the heads of Four Eyed Earthlings, their ‘back-eyes,’ are, as much as
possible, functionally and physiologically identical to the eyes in the fronts of their
heads, their ‘front-eyes.’ With both sets of eyes open and functioning normally, the
visual field of a Four-Eyed Earthling appears much the way the imagery on a split
screen television monitor appears, the left portion of the field informing the Four-
Eyed Earthling of what is taking place in front of him or her, the right portion
informing the Four-Eyed Earthling of what is taking place in back of him or her.
Color vision and its associated phenomenology is the same whether via back-eyes or
front-eyes. For example, a ripe red Four-Eyed Earth tomato, viewed by a Four-Eyed
Earthling with his or her front-eyes, gives rise to an experience phenomenologically
type-identical to the experience produced by that same tomato viewed by the Four-
Eyed Earthling with his or her back-eyes.
The front-eye and back-eye systems belong to the same broad kind; both are
visual systems, both are involved in the production of states possessing visual
phenomenal character, and both are involved in the production of color experiences
whose range is familiar from our own human/Earthling case. In effect, Four-Eyed
Earthlings have our ordinary human/Earthling visual system twice over: one
complete system that has front-eyes as a component, and another complete system
that has back-eyes as a component. The experiential states produced by these
systems interact with one another to the extent that they can be compared,
contrasted, used in inferences, and in other ways processed by a Four-Eyed
Earthling’s central nervous system. However, it is important, in the next stage of the
thought experiment, to conceive of the visual systems to which front-eyes and back-
eyes belong as distinct visual systems.7 In what sense are the front-eye and back-eye
systems distinct? They are distinct in the sense that, for example, impairments to the
front-eye system are not necessarily impairments to the back-eye system and vice
versa. And they are distinct in the sense that, for another example, a complete
removal or shut down of one system need not have any effect on the other at all. The
two systems could function independently, in other words, even though, in a normal
Four-Eyed Earthling, the systems run in tandem and interact via such a creature’s
split-screen visual field and its central nervous system. It is, as I say, important in
the next stage of the thought experiment that the distinctness of the systems is borne
in mind. I will indicate why in a moment.
Now, getting back to the thought experiment, imagine that you are a Four-Eyed
Earthling who has planned a trip to ‘Four-Eyed Inverted Earth’, a planet exactly like
your home planet except that everything there has a color complementary to the
color it has back home on Four-Eyed Earth. Your days on Four-Eyed Earth have
included plenty of ripe tomato experiences, viewed with both your front-eyes and
your back-eyes. Before your trip, you have color-inverting lenses implanted, but
7 This, like the other stage-setting details of the thought experiment, is stipulative; I am stipulating that
the systems in question are distinct, just as I have stipulated that Four-Eyed Earthlings have back-eyes,
interact with plenty of ripe tomatoes, etc.
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only in your front-eyes. For reasons we need not enter into, the day before you leave
for Four-Eyed Inverted Earth, you have your back-eyes surgically sealed shut.
You arrive on Four-Eyed Inverted Earth and enjoy yourself so much that you
decide to stay. At first, the visual experiences you have, via your front-eyes, of ripe
green Four-Eyed Inverted Earth tomatoes misrepresent their color as red. But
eventually the representational shift occurs, and they begin to correctly represent
ripe tomatoes’ color as green. Imagine that, at some stage past the point of the
representational shift, you are standing in a Four-Eyed Inverted Earth produce aisle,
staring with your front-eyes at a ripe green Four-Eyed Inverted Earth tomato. Call it
(the tomato) ‘Fot’. The color experience that Fot produces in you represents Fot as
green. Now suppose that there is a surgeon, usefully hanging around in the produce
aisle, who happens to have an imported, ripe Four-Eyed Earth tomato in his pocket.
As it happens, this tomato is a shade of red that is the exact complementary shade to
Fot’s shade of green. Call it (the tomato) ‘Fom.’ Now the surgeon surgically unseals
your back-eyes, removes Fom from his pocket, and holds it aloft, directly in front of
your back-eyes. Let’s suppose that back-eyes are such that their sealing and
unsealing has no physiological effect on them whatsoever. A set of back-eyes that
have been sealed for even a very long time work just as they would had they never
been sealed at all. With this supposition in place, let’s now ask: what color does
your experience of Fom represent Fom as having? The answer, it seems to me, is
red. Red ripe Four-Eyed Earth tomatoes are the dominant causal source of the type
of color experience you are now having, via your back-eyes, by looking at Fom.
However, your color experience of Fot, via your front-eyes, represents Fot as green.
Here, then, are two color experiences, one of Fom, and one of Fot, that are
representationally quite distinct and so are, according to externalist representation-
alism, phenomenally very different as well.
It is crucial to the argument I am trying to make that I am right that, given a DCS
externalist theory of content, your experience of Fom represents Fom as red.
However, one might object that considerations of dominant causal source do not
clearly imply that the type of color experience you have while looking at Fom
represents Fom as red. It depends, one might say, on how that type is individuated.
Suppose, for example, that the relevant experience-type is individuated in some
broadly functional or physiological way. The details are not relevant; just imagine
some relatively specific functional/physiological type that has your experience of
Fom as an instance. Call this functional/physiological type ‘G-type experiences.’
The problem is that the dominant causal source of G-type experiences could be
greenness (or green Four-Eyed Inverted Earth tomatoes and other green objects) and
that your experiences of Fom and Fot are both G-type experiences. If so, then, given
a DCS theory of content for experiences, it seems that we ought to conclude that
your experience of Fom represents Fom as green, not red.
It is here that it is helpful to remember that the front-eye and back-eye perceptual
systems are distinct systems. Your visual experience of Fom can be individuated in
many ways. Only some of these ways will be relevant to assigning representational
content to the experience. However, given that the front-eye and back-eye systems
are distinct, it seems that individuating your experience of Fom partly in terms of, or
by reference to, the specific system to which it belongs, namely the back-eye visual
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system, is a way that is relevant to what your experience of Fom represents. The
question, ‘‘What color do back-eye experiences of the color of ripe tomatoes
represent those tomatoes as having?’’ might get a different answer than the question,
‘‘What color do front-eye experiences of the color of ripe tomatoes represent those
tomatoes as having?’’ at least in part because front-eyes and back-eyes are
components of distinct visual systems. Of course, it is not always true that
differences in the causal pathways through which representations are produced will
matter to the representational contents of those representations. A voicing of ‘hat’
through a larynx need not differ in any representational feature from a voicing of
‘hat’ through a prosthetic voice box. However, if the causal pathways are parts of
distinct representational systems (as the front-eye and back-eye systems are), and
the objects and properties that cause the representations in the two systems are also
distinct (red objects as opposed to green ones, say), then, given externalism, there
will be good grounds for supposing that the representations produced by the systems
differ in content. All of this is true in the story of Four-Eyed Inverted Earth as I have
told it so far. Hence, an appropriate way to individuate your experience of the color
of Fom is by reference to the back-eye visual system of which it is a part, and the
dominant causal source of your experiences of the color of ripe tomatoes in that
system is red ripe Earth tomatoes. So, the claim that, on DCS-externalist grounds,
your experience of Fom represents Fom as red seems correct.
If your experience of Fom represents Fom as red while your experience of Fot
represents Fot as green, then, according to ER, they produce color experiences in
you that differ greatly in phenomenal character. They differ as much as an ordinary
human visual experience of a red object differs from an ordinary human visual
experience of a green object, which is a dramatic phenomenal difference. But the
trouble with the implication that the color experiences produced by Fot and Fom are
dramatically phenomenally different is that you cannot tell, via those experiences,
that Fot and Fom are different colors. They are perceptually indistinguishable for
you in respect of their colors. If asked to say whether the tomatoes differ in color,
you might be able to correctly judge the matter, since, we may suppose, you know
about the inverted lenses, you know of the color differences between Four-Eyed
Earth and Four-Eyed Inverted Earth tomatoes, and so on. Yet, clearly, your
judgment would not be perceptually based; that is, you do not know, simply based
on the way the tomatoes look, that Fom and Fot differ in color. If (U) is correct, the
perceptual indistinguishability of Fot and Fom implies that your color experiences
of them are not dramatically phenomenally different, contrary to the judgment of
ER.
This jibes with our intuitions about the case. Intuitively, the tomato appearing in
the left portion of your ‘‘split screen’’ visual field, Fot, looks to be exactly the same
color as the tomato appearing in the right portion, Fom. Imagine that there is a
native Four-Eyed Inverted Earthling friend of yours standing next to you in the
produce aisle. Like you, she is looking with her front-eyes at Fot, and with her back-
eyes at Fom. Earlier in the day, just for kicks, this friend of yours popped a pair of
color inverting lenses into her back-eyes. Your friend’s experiences represent both
tomatoes as green, so she poses no challenge to ER. But as far as distinguishing Fot
from Fom by the color they appear to be, you are in no better position than is your
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friend. Your friend’s color experiences of Fot and Fom are not phenomenologically
different and neither are yours: What it is like for you to experience Fot is not
dramatically different from what it is like for you to experience Fom.
Can the claim that Fot and Fom are indistinguishable in color for you be resisted?
It might be thought that proponents of ER have an easy way to resist it. Since, on
their view, Fot is visually represented by you as green, while Fom is visually
represented by you as red, the two tomatoes produce color experiences with
different phenomenal characters, and, hence, look different in color to you. But if
they look different in color, you should be able to infer, on that basis, that Fot and
Fom differ in color. If that is right, then, contrary to what I said above, Fot and Fom
are distinguishable in color for you after all. Why should proponents of ER agree
with the claim that they are indistinguishable in color?
The answer is: an effect of the color-inverting lenses implanted in your front-eyes
is that they make Fot indistinguishable in color from Fom. The lenses invert the
colors of things; they make green things look red, among other color inversions.
Green Fot is made, by the lenses, to look red to you. In fact, they make Fot look to
you to be exactly the same color as Fom. It may be that proponents of ER are under
pressure from their theoretical commitments to deny these straightforward
descriptions of the effect of the color-inverting lenses. But that, in essence, is the
very problem with ER that the story of Four-Eyed Inverted Earth is meant to bring
out.
Can proponents of ER get away with admitting that Fot would have been
indistinguishable from Fom if both had been viewed before the representational
shift, but that now, after the shift, the two tomatoes are no longer indistinguishable
in color? That suggests that the effect of the color-inverting lenses might be
counteracted, somehow, by the representational shift or what caused it. But this is
implausible. Counteracting the effect of the lenses would seem to require some
intrinsic change to the lenses or to your front-eyes, but neither change occurs in the
story. All that happens is that green tomatoes come to be the dominant causal source
of your experiences of the color of tomatoes via your front-eyes. But that is not a
change that will counteract the color-inverting effect of the lenses, which, again, is
to make Fot indistinguishable from Fom.
4 Other Externalisms
Perhaps the tale of Four-Eyed Inverted Earth shows that some varieties of ER are
committed to the possibility that objects that are perceptually indistinguishable in a
certain respect may give rise to dramatically phenomenally different experiences of
that respect, but does it show that all are? What of externalists who deny that
experiences represent the objects and properties that are their dominant causal
source? For example, some externalists propose teleological theories of mental
representational content.8 According to such theories, mental states, including
experiences, represent the objects and properties they are designed, by Mother
8 Millikan (1984) and Papineau (1984) defend versions of teleological externalism about mental content.
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Nature, to indicate. If a mental state type has been selected for indicating red things,
it will represent things as red, and will go on representing things as red, even if the
state type comes to be caused in the majority of cases by green things. Both Lycan
and Tye avow teleological versions of ER, and both argue that this allows them to
accommodate the Blockian intuition that there is no phenomenal shift in the original
Inverted Earth story. They need not admit a phenomenal shift, they say, because
they are not committed to there being a representational shift in the first place. If it is
the evolutionary function of one of your experience types to represent redness, then
a mere move to Inverted Earth or Four-Eyed Inverted Earth will not disrupt this
function, and so will not effect a shift in the representational content of the type.
Lycan’s and Tye’s appeals to teleological accounts of representational content
suggest a more general strategy for externalist representationalists to pursue in the
face of the Inverted Earth and Four-Eyed Inverted Earth stories: simply cook up a
theory of content that does not imply that the experiences of the space travelers in
the those stories undergo a representational shift. A teleological theory is one theory
of content that fits the bill, but no doubt there are others.
The trouble with this general strategy is that it misgauges the depth of the
problem raised by the Inverted Earth and Four-Eyed Inverted Earth stories. It is true
that these stories, as they have been (re)told here, target a variety of ER (a DCS
variety) that is perhaps not held by any actual externalist representationalist. But it is
also clear that, for any representationalist theory that is genuinely externalist, there
is going to be some thought experimental scenario that challenges the theory in
much the way that the stories of Inverted Earth and Four-Eyed Inverted Earth do.
Externalists about experiential content admit that extrinsic differences between a
subject at different times might suffice for differences in that subject’s experiential
contents at those times. So there will be some conceivable scenario in which the
relevant extrinsic differences obtain and the contents therefore differ. If the
differences can obtain without the subject knowing or noticing the differences (This
is the effect of the inverting lenses in the Inverted Earth and Four-Eyed Inverted
Earth stories.) then it seems that these differently representing experiences might
have perceptually indistinguishable features of objects as their cause. In other
words, for any externalist theory of representational content, there will be a story,
very much like the Four-Eyed Inverted Earth story, in which perceptually
indistinguishable features of objects produce representationally distinct experiences
of those features in a given subject. Since (U) is true, these experiences cannot be
dramatically phenomenally different, so there is no true version of externalist
representationalism, whether the externalism in question is DCS-externalism,
teleological externalism, or otherwise.
For those not quite convinced by this line, consider the ways in which the Four-
Eyed Inverted Earth story could be modified to pose a challenge to teleological
versions of ER. Tye himself (Tye 1998) suggests one such way by imagining a
swamp duplicate of himself migrating to Inverted Earth. A swamp duplicate of Tye
is a creature microphysically type-identical to Tye that forms spontaneously when
lightning strikes a swamp. Swamp-Tye lacks an evolutionary history, so none of its
states have teleological functions. But Tye admits that it is implausible to think that
Swamp-Tye lacks representational mental states and phenomenal consciousness
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entirely. Even if Swamp-Tye lacks these things at first, surely, Tye says, it will
acquire them eventually. In other words, a teleological account of the represen-
tational contents of experiences cannot be the full story about content determination
for experiences. Swamp-Tye has, or at least comes to have, experiences with
representational contents, but these experiences do not have the contents they do
because of Swamp-Tye’s teleology. Swamp-Tye does not have one of those. So how
do Swamp-Tye’s experiences come to have the contents they do eventually come to
have? Presumably, something much like the DCS externalist’s story applies to the
contents of at least swamp creatures’ experiences. But then we are off to the races:
simply imagine a swamp duplicate of a Four-Eyed Earthling migrating to Four-Eyed
Inverted Earth. We can tell the same story about a Four-Eyed Earthling swamp
duplicate e´migre´ to Four-Eyed Inverted Earth that we did about the ordinary Four-
Eyed Earthling e´migre´. There will be, for it, objects indistinguishable in color
which, given ER, produce color experiences that do not differ dramatically in
phenomenal character but which are very different in their representational contents.
But swamp creatures are not really required to reveal the difficulty with the
teleological externalist’s ‘solution’ to the problem posed by the stories. It is true that
the teleological externalist is not forced to say that a representational shift occurs
when, in the stories, green tomatoes come to be the dominant causal source of the
space traveler’s ripe tomato experiences. But it does seem that there will be some
point at which even the teleological externalist will have to say that a
representational shift has occurred. The central idea behind teleological theories
is the idea that a mental state-type represents those objects and properties it is
designed to indicate. But a mental state-type designed for one purpose, indicating
red, say, can, over time, be redesigned for a different purpose, indicating green, say.
Such redesign is commonplace in nature. Organs and other body parts gain new
functions or stop functioning in the way they once did, for example. But if
teleological ER allows that a mental state-type can be redesigned to indicate green,
when it was originally designed to indicate red, we can simply build the conditions
under which this redesign would take place into the details of a Four-Eyed Inverted
Earth story. Is there something in the conditions under which an experiential state-
type might gain a new function that will block the consequence that is so damaging
to ER, namely the consequence that dramatically phenomenally different experi-
ences may be produced by indistinguishable features of objects? I cannot see that
there is. In fact, here is a version of the tale that appears to pose the problem for
teleological theories more directly than the Swampman variation.
You are Four-Eyed Earthling with a strange genetic mutation that has two
interesting effects. First, the mutation causes Four-Eyed Earthlings who have it to
develop a condition in their front-eyes that has exactly the effect that the color-
inverting lenses of the earlier variations of the tale had. Four-Eyed Earthlings with
the mutation wake up one day to find that, via their front-eyes, ripe tomatoes look
green, the sky on a clear day looks yellow, and so on. Second, the mutation causes
the back-eyes of Four-Eyed Earthling who has it to, one day, seal shut. In your case,
both effects of the mutation have already occurred. Shortly after they occurred, you
rocketed off to Four-Eyed Inverted Earth and took up permanent residence there.
During your time on Four-Eyed Inverted Earth, the visual experiences you have, via
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your front-eyes, of ripe green Four-Eyed Inverted Earth tomatoes misrepresent their
color as red. After all, those experiences have, in your species, the function of
indicating red (Earth) tomatoes, and we are supposing, along with the teleological
externalist representationalist, that an experience-type represents that which it is
designed to indicate. Furthermore, your ripe tomato experiences go on (mis)rep-
resenting the color of ripe green Four-Eyed Inverted Earth tomatoes as red until
your dying days. Green tomatoes come to be the dominant causal source of your
ripe tomato experiences, but this is not yet enough to disrupt the teleological
function your evolutionary history has assigned to them, namely indicating red
tomatoes. However, the mutation is heritable (though offspring of a mutant Four-
Eyed Earthling are born with ‘inverted’ front-eyes and ‘sealed’ back-eyes) and your
great-great-great-great-grandson, Frank, has it too. Now consider the visual
experiences Frank has via his front-eyes of ripe green Four-Eyed Inverted Earth
tomatoes. What color do these experiences represent such tomatoes as having? Even
on a teleological externalist account, the answer, it seems to me, should be green.
Not because green tomatoes are the dominant causal source of those experiences,
but rather because, over time, the experience-type that was designed in you to
indicate red tomatoes has been redesigned, by the time Frank’s generation arrives on
the scene, to indicate green ones.
There Frank stands in a Four-Eyed Inverted Earth supermarket produce aisle,
staring with his front-eyes at a ripe green Four-Eyed Inverted Earth tomato. The
visual experience produced in him by this tomato—let’s just call it ‘Fot’ again—
represents Fot’s color as green. Enter the handy surgeon with Fom, an imported, ripe
Four-Eyed Earth tomato, which is a shade of red exactly complementary to Fot’s
green, in his pocket. The surgeon unseals Frank’s back-eyes and holds Fom aloft,
directly in front of Frank’s back-eyes. Back-eyes, let’s suppose again, are extremely
hardy. Despite the fact that Frank’s back-eyes have been sealed since birth and so
never used, back-eyes ever deteriorate, and upon unsealing function in just the way
the back-eyes of normal Four-Eyed Earthlings and Four-Eyed Inverted Earthlings
do. Now let’s ask: what color does Frank’s experience of Fom represent Fom as
having? On teleological externalist grounds, the answer, it seems to me, should be
red. The experiential state-type of the visual experience Frank has, via his back-
eyes, of Fom was designed in his species to indicate red things. But, unlike their
front-eyes, the mutated back-eyes of Frank’s ancestors were not subject to the same
environmental conditions that served to alter the teleological function of the color
experiences had through them. In fact, up until the surgeon gets his hands on Frank
in the produce aisle, and with the exception of you, Frank’s great-great-great-great-
grandparent, none of Frank’s ancestors have ever had any visual experiences via
their back-eyes. This, I think, makes it plausible to suppose that the teleological
function of the type of color experience Frank has when looking with his back eyes
at Fom is the same as the function that type of color experience originally had in his
ancestral line, namely indicating red. Assuming a teleological account of mental
representation, an experience of that type therefore represents things as red. So
Frank’s experience of Fom represents Fom as red.
But if Frank’s experience of Fom represents Fom as red, while his experience of
Fot represents Fot as green, then, according to representationalism, those
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experiences differ dramatically in phenomenal character. And if they differ
dramatically in phenomenal character, then, according to (U), the colors of the
objects that produce them, Fom and Fot, cannot be perceptually indistinguishable
for Frank. And the trouble, once again, is that it seems that Fom and Fot are
perceptually indistinguishable in color for Frank. The color inverting effect that
Frank’s inherited genetic mutation has on his back-eyes appears to guarantee this.
Frank is no better off, when it comes to distinguishing Fom and Fot by their colors,
than a normal native Four-Eyed Inverted Earthling who has just popped some color
inverting lenses into their back-eyes would be. It appears, then, that even
teleological varieties of ER allow that perceptually indistinguishable features of
objects may give rise to dramatically phenomenally different experiences. So, given
(U), such varieties are false.
5 Perceptual and Introspective Indistinguishability
In a premonition of something close to the argument against ER I have been
presenting here, William Lycan, playing devil’s advocate, considers the following
argument against a view he holds called phenomenal externalism:
If qualia are wide, then there must be a relevant sort of twin earth, on which
the relevant twin WGL’s sensory state has a different representational content
from mine even though he is appeared to in the same qualitative way as I am
now. Yet if I were spontaneously transported to that twin earth and took the
place of my twin, I would notice nothing introspectively, despite a change in
representational content; so my qualia must remain unchanged and so are
narrow (Lycan 2001, 24).
Although Lycan bills it as such, his argument is not quite an argument against
externalism about what Lycan calls ‘qualia.’ (More on Lycan’s use of this term in a
moment.) Instead, it is an argument against a view that is both externalist and
representationalist about ‘qualia,’ just as my own Four-Eyed Inverted Earth
argument is an argument against not simply externalism about phenomenal
character, but rather against the combination of externalism and representationalism
about phenomenal character. After all, one must say, regarding Lycan’s argument,
that the qualia of WGL’s sensory experiences shift when WGL travels to the
‘relevant sort of twin earth’ and takes the place of his twin, only if one also holds, as
a representationalist about qualia would, that a shift in the representational content
of his sensory states implies a shift in the qualia of those states.
Both Lycan’s argument and mine target the combination of externalism and
representationalism about a certain feature of experiences (‘qualia’ in Lyan’s
argument and phenomenal character in mine), and my Four-Eyed Inverted Earth is
essentially the ‘relevant sort of twin earth,’ but, even so, there are differences
between the argument Lycan imagines and the argument involving Four-Eyed
Inverted Earth I presented in earlier sections.
Lycan’s argument concerns ‘qualia,’ which he defines as ‘the introspectible qual-
itative phenomenal features that characteristically inhere in sensory experiences,’
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giving ‘the color of an afterimage’ as a ‘good example’ (Lycan 2001, 17–18). It is
clear from this definition and the example that neither a ‘quale’ nor even the full
collection of ‘qualia’ inhering in a given sensory experience can be identified with
the ‘phenomenal character,’ as I use this latter term, of the experience. There are no
doubt important determinative connections between an experience’s qualia and
what it’s like to undergo the experience (i.e., its phenomenal character), but I have
no specific views about what these might be, and, determinative connections or not,
it is plain that the concepts of qualia and phenomenal character are different.
This is a somewhat superficial difference, however. Someone inclined to use
Lycan’s argument against ER about qualia would be equally inclined, it seems to
me, to use it against ER about phenomenal character. Certainly, the consideration
involving introspective indistinguishability that Lycan’s argument raises against ER
about qualia is just as forceful against ER about phenomenal character. And perhaps
my own Four-Eyed Inverted Earth argument can be turned against ER about qualia,
in Lycan’s sense of ‘qualia.’
Another difference between the two arguments is that, as I noted, Lycan’s
argument appeals to the introspective indistinguishability of a pair of experiences,
whereas my Four-Eyed Inverted Earth argument appeals instead to the perceptual
indistinguishability of features of perceptual objects, the tomatoes, Fot and Fom.
The principle linking introspective indistinguishability to phenomenal/qualitative
sameness that Lycan’s argument suggests is close to the principle that I attributed to
Block in Sect. 1 concerning large, fast phenomenal changes. Block, remember,
claims that such changes are introspectively noticeable. Block attempts to use his
principle to argue against ER, but, as it stands, I think his principle is ineffective in
this regard. The difficulty with the principle is that it concerns introspective
indistinguishability between experiences had at different times, and so raises the
specter of the memory objection discussed in Sect. 2. The argument Lycan imagines
suffers from the same flaw.9
I think that a principle to the effect that a pair of introspectively indistinguishable
occurrent experiences cannot differ dramatically in phenomenal character is very
plausible and would clearly apply in just those places where I have applied (U) in
my various Four-Eyed Inverted Earth scenarios. So it may be that an introspective
indistinguishability principle modeled on (U) would do the same work (U) itself
does. However, strictly speaking, the argument based on (U) that I have presented
does not depend on any claims about introspection or introspective indistinguish-
ability. It depends only on claims about what follows if properties of objects are
perceptually indistinguishable (at one and the same time). This strikes me as a
somewhat more significant difference between the argument Lycan imagines and
my own. My (U)-based argument shows that ER has trouble accommodating certain
9 In the argument Lycan imagines, the sensory experiences said to be introspectively indistinguishable
are not occurrent (cotemporaneous) experiences. The traveling WGL cannot introspectively distinguish a
current sensory experience he is having on ‘the relevant sort of twin earth’ from a past experience he had
on earth. This opens the argument to the memory objection.
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facts about perception and this, it might be plausibly thought, is its fundamental
difficulty.
Although Lycan’s argument concerns qualia, not phenomenal character, and the
introspective indistinguishability of a pair of experiences, not the perceptual
indistinguishability of properties of objects, it may be that some of the objections
that apply to Lycan’s argument are applicable to my own Four-Eyed Inverted Earth
argument. Lycan, remember, does not endorse the argument he presents against ER
about qualia. In fact, he offers an objection to the argument that runs as follows:
The same goes for propositional attitudes, i.e., the Earthling transported to
Twin Earth would notice nothing introspectively, despite the change in her/his
belief and desire contents. Yet the attitude contents are still wide. Wideness
does not entail introspective change under transportation (Lycan 2001, 24).
The trouble with this objection is that it defends only the externalist part of ER, not
the representationalist part.10 It may be that representational contents generally,
experiential contents as well as propositional attitude contents, are externalistically
determined. If so, then, as the ‘transportation scenarios’ imagined in Lycan’s
argument and my own Four-Eyed Inverted Earth argument suggest, it may also be
that representational differences between a subject’s attitudes or experiences may
exist without that subject having introspective access to those differences and
without that subject being able to perceptually distinguish the features that give rise
to those representationally distinct attitudes or experiences. But when we add
representationalism to the mix, and insist that differences in phenomenal character
or qualia ‘track’ the representational differences in the relevant representational
states, then, it seems, indistinguishability, either introspective or perceptual,
presents a problem. For it seems impossible that two perceptually indistinguishable
features of objects should give rise to experiences that differ dramatically in
phenomenal character or qualia. And it seems likewise impossible for two
introspectively indistinguishable experiences to differ dramatically in phenomenal
character or qualia. Lycan is right that, as he puts it, ‘wideness does not entail
introspective change under transportation.’ But if one holds both that the
representational contents of experiences are wide (externalism), and that a
difference in representational content between two experiences implies that the
two differ—and can differ dramatically—in phenomenal character (representation-
alism), then, as the traveling scenarios appear to show, one’s view commits one to
the possibility of introspectively indistinguishable, yet dramatically phenomenally
distinct experiences, caused by perceptually indistinguishable features of objects.
But the fact that the view has this commitment shows that the view cannot be true,
10 Of course, Lycan thinks that his introspective indistinguishability argument is an argument against
externalism about qualia, not against externalist representationalism about qualia. As I say in the main
text, he is wrong to conceive of it this way; that is, the argument he actually presents is an argument
against representationalist versions of externalism about qualia. Still, since Lycan (mis)conceives of the
argument as threatening to just externalism about qualia, it is no wonder, really, that his reply to the
argument defends only the externalist part of ER.
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since each kind of indistinguishability suffices on its own to rule out large
phenomenal differences between the relevant experiences.
6 Conclusion
Putnam’s Twin Earth has convinced many of us that intrinsically identical subjects
do not necessarily share the same representational states. I believe that there is water
in the oceans but my Twin Earth twin, with whom I am identical ‘down to the last
micro-particle,’ lacks this belief. One way in which externalism is a surprising
doctrine is that representational differences between two subjects (a difference in
their beliefs, e.g.) might not affect the way things seem to them. Or, more carefully,
since there is no doubt an ‘attitudinal’ understanding of ‘the way things seem,’ a
representational difference between two subjects might not amount to a felt
difference; it might not matter to what it is like to be in those differing
representational states. I could switch places with my Twin Earth twin and never
know the difference, not even when, according to externalism, I shed my de dicto
beliefs about water and gain a new set of de dicto beliefs about twin water. Many
experiential states, and arguably all perceptual experiential states are, like beliefs
and the other propositional attitudes, representational states, and it is now common
to hold that externalism, if true of any mental state, is true of representational states
generally. But unlike beliefs, perceptual states have specific phenomenal characters,
and this fact limits our theoretical options regarding them. If we hold an externalist
view of the representational contents of perceptual states, then our externalism
prevents us from going on to endorse representationalism about the phenomenal
characters of those states. According to the argument of this paper, we are prevented
in this not because of a brute intuition that phenomenal character is ‘narrow,’ but
rather because of the link between indistinguishability and the absence of dramatic
differences in phenomenal character. We can learn to live with the consequence of
externalism that differently representing mental states might be caused by
perceptually indistinguishable features of objects. We cannot, or so I have argued
here, accept that phenomenally very different perceptual states might be caused by
perceptually indistinguishable properties of objects. However, this is precisely what
externalist versions of representationalism ask us to accept. Such versions, then,
ought to be rejected.11
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
11 I thank two anonymous referees (this journal) for detailed and helpful comments and criticism that led
to very substantial changes in this paper. My debt to Ned Block, who has done more than anyone else to
raise doubts about ER, is obvious. The seeds of the main ideas in this paper are all to be found in Block’s
work on the subject. Many informal philosophical discussions influenced my thinking about the issues
covered in this paper. I thank Joe Lau, Patrick Hawley, Robert Schroer, Harry Deutsch, Kelly Trogdon,
and Lam Ka Ho for these.
The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look 315
123
References
Block, N. (1990). Inverted earth. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives 4 (pp. 53–79).
Northridge: Ridgeview.
Block, N. (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), Perception, philosophical issues
7 (pp. 19–49). Atascadero: Ridgeview.
Block, N. (1998). Is experiencing just representing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58,
663–670.
Chalmers, D. (2004). The representational character of experience. In B. Leiter (Ed.), The future of
philosophy (pp. 153–181). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Deutsch, M. (2005). Intentionalism and intransitivity. Synthese, 144(1), 1–22.
Dretske, F. (1997). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (2004). Change blindness. Philosophical Studies, 120(1–3), 1–18.
Graff, D. (2001). Phenomenal continua and the sorites. Mind, 110(440), 905–936.
Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives
4 (pp. 31–52). Northridge: Ridgeview.
Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lycan, W. (2001). The case for phenomenal externalism. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical
perspectives 15 (pp. 17–36). Oxford: Blackwell.
Lycan, W. (2004). Representational theories of consciousness. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The standford
encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435–450.
Papineau, D. (1984). Representation and explanantion. Philosophy of Science, 51, 550–572.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (1998). Inverted earth, swampman, and representationism. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical
perspectives 12 (pp. 459–477). Oxford: Blackwell.
316 M. Deutsch
123
